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For more than thirty years, numerous coal-fired, electric utility plants
have enjoyed "grandfathered" status under the Clean Air Act (CAA),
leaving them virtually untouched by the dictates of increasingly stringent
air pollution regulation in the United States. The Clean Air Act of 1970,
which essentially codified the federal regulatory approach toward air
pollution, established a two-tiered framework for the regulation of major
stationary sources of air pollution.1 This approach mandated stricter federal
pollution-control technology requirements on power plants built after the
passage of new regulatory standards than those applicable to existing
plants. This bifurcated approach, often called the "old-new division"2 in
pollution-control regulation, continues to the present day, despite two
subsequent rounds of amendments to the CAA in 1977 and 1990.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 introduced two programs,
New Source Review (NSR) and Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(PSD), which attempted to narrow the old-new divide in control technology
requirements. Any major modification of an old source would render it
"good as new" for federal regulatory purposes, leading to the imposition of
the same control technology requirements that new sources were obligated
to follow in a given area. Despite this subsequent "narrowing," many old
sources, particularly coal-burning utility plants, predominantly located in
the Midwest, continue to operate under more lenient pollution-control
1. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (2000)).
2. Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1983).
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requirements. Together, these old sources are responsible for approximately
two-thirds of the nation's sulfur dioxide emissions, forty percent of carbon
dioxide emissions, and one-third of the nation's nitrogen oxide and mercury
pollution.3 Moreover, if these plants were subject to the same federal
technology requirements imposed on their new source counterparts, their
emissions figures would diminish by several orders of magnitude.4
Unfortunately, the last major round of amendments to the Clean Air Act,
which took place in 1990, did little to further narrow the old-new divide in
federal pollution-control technology requirements for major stationary
sources of air pollution. 5
The continued grandfathering of old sources runs afoul of not only the
stated purpose of the CAA to improve the nation's air quality, but also its
larger policy goal of stimulating investment in and growth of cleaner
technologies. Even if the original motivations behind a two-tiered approach
in the 1970 CAA were justifiable both from a policy and constitutional
6standpoint, a contention that even some current critics of grandfathering
seem to support, much doubt exists as to its continued utility or validity. In
1998, two congressional bills were introduced that would have eliminated
the grandfathered status of coal-fired power plants under the Clean Air
Act.7 However, these bills were unable to withstand the arguments of
electricity-generation firms and their allies in Congress. A cynical observer
might attribute (and, indeed, many have) the failure of such bills to the
3. See Harmonizing the Clean Air Act with Our Nation's Energy Policy: Hearing Before the
Senate Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and the Nuclear Safety Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of David Hawkins, Director, Air
and Energy Program, Natural Resources Defense Council), at http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/
tdh0301.asp [hereinafter NRDC Report]; see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., State and Federal
Command-and-Control Regulation of Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Electric Power Generating
Plants, 32 ENvTL. L. 369, 372 (2002). Reitze states:
In 1999, coal was used to generate 52.8% of the electricity generated in the United
States; petroleum was used to produce 2.56%; and natural gas was used to produce
10.78%.... Most of the nation's coal-burning plants were constructed between 1950
and 1980, and these plants are the nation's most significant stationary source of air
pollution. New electric power plants almost always use gas-fired turbines because such
plants are less expensive to construct, have a higher thermal efficiency, and produce far
less pollution. This offsets the need for gas, which is more expensive than coal.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
4. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Reducing Emission from the Electricity Generation Industry: Can We
Finally Do It?, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 427, 434 n.35 (2001).
5. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Section II.D. See generally Huber, supra note 2 (discussing the reasons
underlying the popularity of two-tiered regulation).
7. Senate Bill 2636, introduced in October 1998 by Senator Leahy (a Democrat from
Vermont), would have required existing generating units to meet New Source Review within ten
years, as well as meet other emissions and efficiency standards for NO., C0 2, and mercury.
S. 2636, 105th Cong. (1998). Senate Bill 2610, introduced in October 1998 by Senator Lieberman
(a Democrat from Connecticut), would also have required grandfathered generating units to meet
New Source Review. S. 2610, 105th Cong. (1998); see also Hsu, supra note 4, at 36 (discussing
Congress's failure to enact the above-mentioned bills).
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lobbying power of the energy industry and, while lamenting the power of
big money to influence environmental legislation, accept this aspect of
American politics and focus the scholarly discourse on approaches more
attuned to political realities, such as market-driven, cap-and-trade
programs, which have become increasingly popular in recent decades.
8
This outright dismissal is simplistic, however, because the old-new
distinctions were originally adopted in the 1970 CAA with a variety of
motives. 9 Their original inclusion was due in large part to Fifth Amendment
takings considerations, as well as some undoubtedly political motives. It is
this former takings argument, not the political motivations' ° behind the old-
new distinctions in technology requirements under the CAA, that will serve
as the focus of my analysis. Insofar as the takings argument continues to
validate (or invalidate) old-new distinctions in the regulation of utilities, the
land-use context can serve as a useful conceptual guide.
In the land-use context, zoning law has been forced to contend with a
theoretical problem akin to that presented by the regulation of old sources
under the Clean Air Act. Namely, when local governments pass zoning
ordinances designating the permitted land uses in a given area, certain land
uses will likely already exist on the regulated properties that are
inconsistent with the new zoning ordinances. These preexisting uses,
deemed "nonconforming" uses, cannot be eliminated outright by local
governments without compensation, due to the constitutional protection
afforded property owners against unjust takings. However, if these uses
were allowed to continue indefinitely, they would threaten the very purpose
of Euclidian zoning-to ensure an orderly pattern of local development
through the separation of conflicting uses." In response to this conundrum,
a land-use doctrine evolved over the past half century to deal with the issue
of nonconforming uses. In many respects, its pattern of evolution bears a
striking resemblance to the development of the regulatory regime designed
8. Cap-and-trade programs place a limit on total emissions of a given pollutant in a given
area, and then allow firms that emit this pollutant to trade emissions allowances (each allowance
entitles the user to cmit a certain amount) with each other and with other third-party traders. These
types of programs can be contrasted with command-and-control programs, which tend to be more
prescriptive, requiring the installation of certain types of pollution-control equipment. See infra
Section V.C (outlining the arguments commonly offered by proponents and critics of command-
and-control programs).
9. See infra Section II.D.
10. The exclusion of "political" motivations from the analysis is not intended to understate
their importance in the creation of grandfather clauses by legislatures. Air pollution regulation, in
the language of public choice theory, presents a classic example of regulation that generates
distributed benefits and concentrated costs. This type of regulation is typically met with ferocious
resistance and intense lobbying efforts from those special-interest groups that have the most to
lose-in this case, the owners of existing electric utilities. For a discussion of public choice
theory, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 54-60 (3d
ed. 2001).
11. See DANIEL P. SELMI & JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 68 (1999).
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to address old sources of air pollution, from the lenient 1970 CAA to the
comparatively stringent 1977 CAA Amendments.
Regulations emerged in the zoning context that allowed a
nonconforming use to continue provided there were no major alterations to
the use.' 2 Zoning regulators believed that these restrictions would cause the
gradual disappearance of such nonconforming uses. 13 Similarly, the 1977
Amendments to the CAA attempted to bring more old sources within the
ambit of the new source-control technology regime under the NSR and PSD
programs, in which "major modifications" to old sources would result in the
loss of grandfathered or protected status. Again, the expectation behind
such restrictions was the gradual replacement of old sources by newer,
cleaner sources. Interestingly, in both cases, such restrictions failed to bring
about the desired goal: the elimination of the nonconforming use.' 4 In fact,
the opposite has occurred due to the unique economic advantages
unwittingly bestowed upon owners of old sources and nonconforming uses
alike by these types of regulations. They have created incentives to continue
nonconforming uses in the land-use context, and in the air pollution
context, to extend the life of old, coal-burning utilities beyond what was
originally envisioned in the CAA.'5
Land-use regulation, however, has given birth to one technique that, in
many cases, has successfully resulted in the elimination of nonconforming
uses-amortization. Zoning laws can require the termination of
nonconforming uses provided that the owner is given a sufficient time
period in which her property investment can be amortized. Although it is
often a controversial technique, tolerated in different measure by the courts
of different states, it is generally accepted provided that the amortization
period is a "reasonable" one. Thus, one can say that the general concept of
amortization has survived takings challenges in the land-use context.
Interestingly, it has never been incorporated into the highly analogous air
pollution context, and takings arguments continue to carry weight in the
legislative debate over the elimination of old-new distinctions in technology
requirements.
In Part II of this Note, I will provide an overview of how the regulatory
framework has developed with regard to federal control technology
12. 7 PATRICK ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, § 41.01[2], at 41-7 (1978); see
also Hinves v. Comm'r of Pub. Works, 172 N.E.2d 232 (Mass. 1961) (finding that the owner's
use of property as a catering service did not constitute a continuance of the nonconforming use of
property as a grocery store); 7 ROHAN, supra, § 41.01[5], at 41-19 ("In the absence of a specific
statute to the contrary, an existing nonconforming use will be permitted to continue only if it is a
continuance of substantially the same use made before the zoning enactment.").
13. See 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.01[2], at 41-7.
14. See 7 id. § 41.01[2], at 41-7 to -8; see also infra note 60 (discussing the reasons why the
expected retirement of old coal-fired plants has not occurred).
15. See infra note 60.
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requirements governing major stationary sources. I will focus on the
statutory language of the 1970 CAA and the 1977 CAA Amendments and
subsequent administrative and judicial interpretations. In Part III, I will
examine the development of land-use doctrine governing the regulation of
preexisting nonconforming uses and highlight its theoretical similarities to
the air pollution context. In Part IV, I will look specifically at the
jurisprudence surrounding the use of amortization provisions in the zoning
context. By and large, a court's acceptance of an amortization provision in
the majority of cases hinges on a determination of the reasonableness of an
amortization period based on (1) a balancing of public good against private
loss and/or (2) the length of the amortization period in relation to the
investment. Another important vein of judicial reasoning that emerges on
the "reasonableness" of amortization provisions in the takings calculation is
what I term the "amortization-compensation equation." This line of
reasoning, popularized in the context of billboard amortization, suggests
that the monopolistic position afforded to the owner of a nonconforming
use during the amortization period is itself a type of compensation for
future loss. In Part V, I will propose that the incorporation of amortization
provisions into the Clean Air Act could provide a viable solution to the
problem posed by old sources and, if applied properly, is a solution that is
both preferable to several proposed alternatives and one that should
successfully withstand constitutional takings arguments. Finally, I will
frame this proposal within the context of a larger debate between the
proponents and critics of command-and-control regulation.
II. THE "GRANDFATHERING" OF OLD SOURCES: AN OVERVIEW
A. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 established the basic
regulatory framework of air pollution control in the United States. This
legislation directed the newly created Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to establish two sets of National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants. 16 Depending on whether air quality
regions in a state met or fell short of these uniform, federally prescribed
NAAQS, they were designated as "attainment" or "nonattainment" areas. 7
16. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 108-109, 84 Stat. 1676, 1678-80
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (2000)). The EPA sets primary standards, which
limit allowable pollution to levels that will not endanger public health, and secondary standards,
which set maximum levels of pollution that will not endanger the public welfare. Criteria
pollutants are essentially widespread pollutants that endanger public health. They include carbon
monoxide (CO), particulate matter, hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides (NO.), and photochemical
oxidants (i.e., ozone).
17. § 107, 84 Stat. at 1678.
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In addition, the 1970 Act established new source performance standards
(NSPS) for certain categories of new sources. Section 111 of the CAA
directs the EPA to set numerical emissions limitations designed to reflect
"the best system of emission reduction" available based on the pollution-
control technology that has been "adequately demonstrated" to be the
best.' 8 NSPS standards would be established for various categories of new
sources based on a determination that such a source would pose a major
contribution to air pollution.19 Moreover, the Act defined "new" sources as
those whose construction or modification commenced after the proposal of
NSPS for that source category. 20 Although both new and old sources would
still be subject to ambient air quality regulation implemented by states, only
new sources would be forced to install more stringent pollution-control
equipment in order to meet NSPS requirements. Thus began the two-tiered
regulatory system distinguishing old and new sources of air pollution under
the Clean Air Act.
B. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
The deficiencies of the 1970 Act became clear by the middle of the
decade. Not only were many air quality regions throughout the country in
violation of the NAAQS, but the 1970 Act also "failed to address how the
states were to meet the need for economic development, which might
include the construction of new sources of pollution.",2 1 While the Act
remained ambiguous on the subject of new source growth in attainment
areas, it forced states to "prevent the construction or modification of any
new source.., which the State determines will prevent the attainment or
maintenance" of the NAAQS.23 Thus, it seemed to mandate the prohibition
of new source growth in nonattainment areas. Although a 1976 EPA
interpretive ruling known as the "emissions offset policy" attempted to fill
18. § 11 t(a)(1), 84 Stat, at 1683.
19. § 11 l(b)(1)(A), 84 Stat. at 1684.
20. § 11 (a)(2), 84 Stat. at 1683; see also THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 259-60 (Robert
J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 1998) (noting that even if a regulation is not final at the
time a source is constructed or modified, so long as it has been proposed, the source is subject to
the NSPS regulation because it has been effectively put "on notice" of the impending regulation).
As the editors of the handbook note:
This is contrary to the typical regulatory approach with respect to grandfathering
sources before issuance of afinal rule. Congress chose this approach to prevent a flurry
of activity to grandfather sources just shortly after proposal of a rule as a means to
avoid being subject to a new standard.
Id. at 260.
21. Jack L. Landau, Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC: The Supreme Court Declines To Burst EPA's
Bubble Concept, 15 ENVTL. L. 285, 290-91 (1985).
22. See Leslie Maxfield & Jerry Nye, Comment, Non-Degradation and Pollution Control
Alternatives Under Clean Air Act of 1970, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 507, 512 (1974).
23. § 1 10(a)(4), 84 Stat. at 1681.
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this gap by establishing provisions for new source growth in nonattainment
areas, it only further strengthened the old-new divide by placing
responsibility for the financing of old source emissions reduction on new24
sources. The "emissions offset policy" allowed states to permit the
construction of new sources of pollution in nonattainment areas so long as
either the states or new sources could procure emission reductions from
existing sources to offset new pollution.
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments not only clearly specified the
manner in which new source growth would be allowed in both attainment
and nonattainment areas, but they also forced old sources to shoulder more
responsibility for emissions reduction. First, regarding state implementation
programs, these Amendments required states to impose emission limits on
existing pollution sources (i.e., old sources) in nonattainment areas based
on "reasonably available control technology" (RACT).
2 5 Moreover, while
the Amendments continued to incorporate new source performance
standards, they also introduced two new permitting programs for the
construction or modification of "major" sources in attainment and
nonattainment areas.
In nonattainment areas, the New Source Review program allowed the
growth of new sources as well as major modifications to existing sources
provided that they submit to a stringent permitting process and
preconstruction requirements. Codified in part D to title I of the 1977 CAA
Amendments, NSR requires "major stationary sources" in nonattainment
areas to meet the "lowest achievable emission rate" (LAER),
2 6 which
encompasses "the most stringent emission limitation" possible, irrespective
of the costs of compliance. 27 LAER imposes the strictest of control
technology requirements under the CAA. In addition, the 1977
Amendments mandate emissions "offsetting" by new or modified sources
in nonattainment areas.28
In attainment areas, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program
established a permitting process that attempted to preserve existing air
quality. The PSD program requires new or modified "major emitting
facilit[ies]" to implement the "best available control technology" (BACT)
for the emissions of every criterion pollutant it will increase by more than a
de minimis amount. 29 BACT requirements, while exacting, differ from
LAER requirements in that they "take[] into account energy,
24. Requirements for Preparation, Adaptation, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 41
Fed. Reg. 55,524, 55,524-26 (Dec. 21, 1976) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2003)).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (2000). RACT is the least stringent type of control technology
regulation imposed by the CAA.
26. id. § 7503(a)(2).
27. Id. § 7501(3)(A).
28. Id. § 7503(c)(1),
29. Id. § 7475(a)(4).
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environmental, economic, and other costs."3 ° Moreover, PSD further
requires a new or modified source to demonstrate that it will not exceed the
increment of allowable air quality deterioration prescribed by the EPA.
31
Unmodified old sources in attainment areas are subject only to state
ambient standards, however.
Together, the NSR and PSD programs have been identified by "[b]oth
commentators and members of Congress... as the most significant foci of
the 1977 Act" and "the method by which the EPA most often exerts direct
control over emissions." 32 In and of itself, however, the language of the
1977 Act seems to do little to bridge the old-new source gap. Aside from
the imposition of RACT requirements on old sources in nonattainment
areas and the more stringent LAER and BACT requirements triggered by
major modifications of old sources, the statutory language itself seems to
leave the two-tiered regulatory framework codified by the 1970 Act more
or less intact. More than the actual language of the 1977 Amendments,
however, it has been subsequent judicial and EPA interpretations of the
statutory language that have attempted to narrow the old-new source divide
in the imposition of federal pollution-control technology requirements.
33
C. Subsequent Interpretations of the 1977 Amendments
The ambiguous language of the Act, even after the 1977 Amendments,
left several questions to be resolved by EPA rulemaking and, upon industry
challenge, by courts. 34 Among the questions most pertinent to the
application of PSD and NSR to old sources were, first, what constitutes a
major modification of an existing source and, second, what constitutes a
30. See Landau, supra note 21, at 295.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(7). The PSD program establishes three different classes of attainment
areas and allows varying amounts of air quality degradation in each. For instance, in Class I areas,
which include national parks and wilderness area, very little air quality deterioration is permitted.
In Class III areas, which encompass urban or industrial locations, PSD permits larger amounts of
air quality degradation. See id. §§ 7472-7473.
32. Josh Drew, Comment, Calculating Potential To Emit Under the Clean Air Act: The
Importance of Federal Enforceability, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1114, 1123 (1997); see also DAVID P.
CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS § 6.14, at 6-40 (1981) (discussing the
significance of the NSR/PSD programs).
33. Although the 1990 Amendments have done little in the way of further narrowing this old-
new gap, one change is worth mentioning. Section 7412 outlines 189 toxic air pollutants that must
be regulated by means of "maximum achievable control technology," and it applies to all major
stationary sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b).
34. One of the first questions addressed upon passage of the 1970 Amendments was what
constituted a major emitting facility for purposes of PSD. The 1977 Act defined a major emitting
facility as one of twenty-eight types of stationary sources that "emit, or have the potential to emit,
one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant," as well as "any other source with the
potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant." Id. § 7479(1).
The EPA's liberal interpretation of this statutory language was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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significant net increase in emissions. The CAA provides that a facility
undertaking a "major modification" that causes a "significant net emissions
increase" is subject to NSR and PSD review and must install the requisite
control technology. 35 Moreover, the CAA defines a modification as "any
physical change, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary
source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted. 3 6 Although
no explicit exemption exists in the statute for routine maintenance
activities, subsequent EPA regulations exempted "routine maintenance,
repair and replacement" from the definition of a "major modification.
'" 37
Such an exemption was necessary to make the Act administratively
feasible, 38 or as the EPA subsequently explained, without such an
exemption, the definition would "encompass the most mundane activities at
an industrial facility (even the repair or replacement of a single leaky
pipe).
39
However, even the definition of "routine maintenance, repair and
replacement" proved a highly contentious issue. The D.C. Circuit in
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle seemed to restrict the EPA's routine
maintenance exemption to "de minimis" activities, 40 for this was necessary
in order to assure that the grandfathering of existing sources would not
"constitute a perpetual immunity from all standards under the PSD
program.,,4 Although the EPA did not specify the meaning of "routine
maintenance" in its regulation, it attempted to define the concept further in
subsequent interpretive memoranda and industry NSR determinations.42
These subsequent interpretations would prove the subject of much industry
litigation.
Historically, the EPA has looked to four factors in determining whether
a modification was routine rather than major: the nature and extent of the
modification, its purpose, frequency, and cost.43 For the most part, this
administrative analysis has survived two decades of court challenges, most
notably in Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly44 (WEPCO). A more in-
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4).
36. Id.
37. 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments To Prevent Significant Deterioration, 43 Fed. Reg.
26,388, 26,404 (June 19, 1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(a) (2002)).
38. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. 32,314, 32,316-19 (July 21, 1992); see also John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic
Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990) (discussing the frequent lack of administrative
feasibility in environmental legislation as written by Congress).
39. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 32,316.
40. 636 F.2d 323, 355-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
41. Id. at 400.
42. See Peter Lehner, Clean Air Litigation in a Restructuring Electricity World, 18 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 314 n.17 (2001).
43. See Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 910-11 (7th Cir. 1990).
44. Id.
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depth examination of the "purpose" factor reveals an intent to "smoke out"
old sources intent on prolonging their lives indefinitely, a message
reminiscent of Alabama Power. Namely, in assessing the purpose of a
modification, the WEPCO court distinguished routine maintenance
activities from those modifications intended to "extend the life expectancy"
of the plant, finding the latter to trigger NSR/PSD requirements. 45
Moreover, EPA interpretations of what constitutes a "significant net
increase" in emissions have also attempted to clarify ambiguities in the
CAA, but, again, these interpretations have given rise to industry challenge.
For nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions, a significant net emissions
increase is defined as more than forty tons per year in attainment areas and
somewhat less in nonattainment areas.46 In calculating these emissions
changes, "the basic concept.., for power plants is to compare pre-
modification actual emissions to the actual emissions as they would be
projected after the change. 'A7 In the projection of future emissions,
however, any emissions increases due solely to increased demand, rather
than those attributable to the proposed change, are exempted from the
calculation.48 This rule, known as the "demand growth exclusion" rule,
which allows electric utilities to ignore coincidental emissions increases
that result from other factors such as growth in electricity demand, has been
questioned by the EPA in recent years,49 but has nonetheless remained
intact.
Despite these administrative and judicial attempts to bring more
existing sources within the purview of stringent federal technology
requirements, many existing electric utility plants have continued to escape
the NSR/PSD provisions. Among the reasons for this failure are, first, "the
rules themselves contain too many loopholes that allow sources to avoid
NSR even though they continue to make significant investments year after
year,, 50 and, second, some old sources have unlawfully misclassified
45. Id. at 912; see also In re Tenn. Valley Auth., No. CAA-2000-04-008, 2000 WL 1358648,
at *52 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Sept. 15, 2000) (defining "maintenance projects" as "those projects
that merely restore tangible assets to serviceability" as opposed to capital projects, which are
"projects that add tangible new assets or leave existing assets in 'better condition' than when the
original asset was installed for profitable service").
46. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2) (2002).
47. See Lehner, supra note 42, at 316. The calculation of premodification emissions is based
on the highest two of the previous five years of emissions. Id.
48. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(33)(ii).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 129-130.
50. See NRDC Report, supra note 3, § IV. Such loopholes include the following: (1)
categorical exemptions and exclusions; (2) weak rules for calculating emissions increases; and (3)
broad provisions for "netting" out of review, which allow existing sources to count "reductions"
from grandfathered pieces of polluting equipment in calculating whether a new project will result
in an emissions increase that would trigger NSR. Introduced in 1981, "[n]etting allows a
grandfathered pollution source to 'bequeath' its pollution privileges to its descendant, the new
piece of equipment." Id.
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projects in order to escape NSR requirements. 5 1 Thus, the current picture is
fairly dismal. Electric power plants built more than twenty years ago are
responsible for "84% of total US nitrogen oxides (NO.) pollution from that
sector and 88% of sulfur dioxide (SOx). In contrast, 20-year-old cars
contribute less than 7% of US car NOx pollution and 3% of that sector's
VOC (volatile organic compounds) pollution.' ' 2
D. Motivations for Grandfathering: Historical and Legislative Perspective
In light of its regressive effects in the air pollution context, it merits
asking: What led to the adoption of a bifurcated, old-new approach in the
first place? The fact is, grandfathering is hardly uncommon in the
regulatory context; the "old-new division cuts deeply into our legislative
landscape." 53 Peter Huber describes the general reasons underlying the
popularity of two-tiered regulation:
Old risks derive from settled production and consumption choices
and from established technology. Their regulation therefore often
faces large economic and social obstacles and incurs transition
costs.... New risks, on the other hand, may be regulated with less
direct disruption of settled expectations. Their regulation incurs a
different type of costs-lost opportunity costs [that] are usually
difficult to measure, and the bearers of these costs may be
neither identifiable nor self-aware.... Regulatory statutes thus
systematically treat new risks more stringently than old ones.
54
Thus, according to Huber, the common perception among legislators is that
regulating new risks more stringently is the "cheaper" alternative to the
regulation of old ones, in terms of transition, political, and social costs.
Even though this might be true in certain contexts, the old-new division can
sometimes promote "regulatory decisions that are technologically
regressive [and] may aggravate hazards they are intended to avoid."55 Thus,
while it is important to keep the social and political costs in the calculus of
such legislation, the formula should be constantly reassessed in view of
changing circumstances.
Looking specifically at the air pollution context, how can the legislative
history of the Clean Air Act be reconciled with Huber's general assessment
51. Such misconduct has become the subject of enforcement actions by the EPA in recent
years. See Christopher W. Armstrong, EPA 's New Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 203, 204 (2000); infra Section V.B.
52, See NRDC Report, supra note 3, § IV.
53. Huber, supra note 2, at 1028.
54. Id. at 1027-28.
55. Id. at 1028.
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of the motivations underlying old-new divisions? The motivations behind
the initial adoption of two-tiered regulation in the 1970 Clean Air Act
amendments (i.e., imposition of federal new source performance standards)
were essentially threefold.56 First, legislators sought to avoid some of the
transition costs associated with the expensive retrofitting of old sources that
would be necessary if NSPS were applied to them. It was thought that the
expenses associated with retrofitting would be at their minimum if imposed
at the time of major modifications to an old source.
57
Second, legislators assumed that the natural turnover of power plants
obviated the need for extensive old source regulation 58 because "[p]ower
plants have typically been built to last thirty to forty years, and
environmental policy has been developed with the assumption that thirty-
year-old plants would soon be phased out of production." 59 This has not
occurred, however, due to the economic incentives for owners of older,
coal-fired electricity generation finns to continue production, 60 incentives
that are in part created by old-new distinctions in pollution-control
technology requirements, which exempt old power plants from more
stringent and costly regulation faced by their new source counterparts.
Finally, legislators were concerned with the property rights of the
owners of existing sources and the potential takings claims associated with
immediate application of new source performance standards. This can be
56. Again, the overtly "political" motivations behind the old-new division in the CAA are not
the focus of this Note. Undoubtedly, grandfathering is also a tool by which legislators are able to
enact forward-thinking legislation that would be politically impossible without some cooperation
and support from the regulated entities. For a general discussion on public choice theory and
interest groups, see supra note 10.
57. See Rachel Zaffrann, New York's Novel Strategy for Combating Air Pollution, 11
FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 59, 66-67 (1999); see also Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901,
909 (7th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that "Congress chose not to subject existing plants to the
requirements of NSPS and PSD" because of the expenses associated with retrofitting compared to
the lesser costs of incorporating control technology during "new or modified construction").
58. See BRUCE BrEWALD ET AL., G RANDFATHERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPARABILITY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AIR EMISSION REGULATIONS AND ELECTRICITY
MARKET DISTORTIONS 2 (1998), at http://Aww.synapse-energy.com/publications.htm; see also
Hsu, supra note 4, at 435 (discussing regulators' assumption of the natural turnover of plants).
59. Hsu, supra note 4, at 435.
60. For a cost comparison of operating older, coal-fired plants versus newer, natural-gas-fired
plants, see id. at 434-36. Hsu notes:
An examination of the economics of power plant operation reveals why the
expected retirement of old coal-fired power plants has not occurred. While natural gas-
fired plants are much cheaper to build and only slightly more expensive to operate and
maintain, older coal-fired plants have no capital costs at all because they have been
fully amortized.... While the per-kWh capital and operating costs of natural gas-fired
plants have been as low as 3 cents/kWh, the operating cost of old coal-fired power
plants is estimated to be, on average, a paltry 2.1 cents/kWh. This cost advantage has
tilted the playing field in coal's favor.
Id. at 435-36 (footnotes omitted). Also, for a discussion of the incentives for continued operation
of old, coal-fired power plants created by subsidies for plants that achieve emissions reductions
through use of scrubber technology, see generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T.
HASSLER, CLEAN COALIDIRTY AIR (1981).
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placed within Huber's "disruption of settled expectations" category. 61 Or in
the language of regulatory takings scholarship, the original adoption of a
two-tiered regulatory framework was an attempt to balance considerations
of fairness as well as efficiency.
62
Although these are generally accepted explanations for the old-new
distinction in the 1970 Act, it is difficult to assess the degree of interplay
among these three motivations in the grandfathering of old sources. Perhaps
if the natural turnover of plants had not been assumed, fairness or expense
considerations would have carried less weight in the legislative analysis.
This is because the stakes of future air pollution would have seemed higher:
An old plant would serve as a threat to the goals of the CAA not just for its
natural life span of thirty or forty years, but decades longer. The takings
rationale is the focus of this Note, however, and whatever the legitimacy of
fairness or takings considerations in the formulation of the 1970 Act, their
continued merit in the legislative analysis is another story altogether. To the
degree that takings considerations bear any continued role in the
justification of old-new divisions in the Clean Air Act, the regulation of
preexisting nonconforming uses in the land-use context can serve as a
useful conceptual guide.
III. FINDING ANALOGIES IN LAND USE:
THE REGULATION OF PREEXISTING NONCONFORMING USES
A. Early History of Zoning Law
The purpose behind comprehensive Euclidean zoning was to ensure an
orderly pattern of local development through the separation of conflicting
land uses. Thus, each comprehensive zoning ordinance compartmentalized
a community into districts and limited each district to a particular type of
land use, usually residential or commercial.63 The authority to enact zoning
legislation was local and "derived from state enabling legislation or from
home rule provisions of state constitutions. ' '64 Early in its history,
proponents of zoning recognized the problem posed by nonconforming
uses, land uses that lawfully existed before a particular zoning regulation
was enacted:
61. See Huber, supra note 2, at 1027.
62. On the balancing of fairness and efficiency in regulatory takings analysis, see WILLIAM
A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 217 (1995).
63. See Richard F. Babcock, What Should and Can Be Done with Nonconforming Uses,
Lecture Before the Institute on Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain at the Southwestern Legal
Foundation (Oct. 21-22, 1972), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND
EMINENT DOMAIN 23, 25 (Southwestern Legal Found. ed., 1972).
64. See 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.04(4), at 41-11.
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[I]t was feared that the whole philosophical justification for zoning
would be impaired if nonconforming uses, i.e., preexisting uses that
did not conform with these homogeneous zoning districts, were
legitimized. If the goal of the regulations was to ensure uniformity
of all uses in a particular district, dissimilar existing uses would
detract from that purpose as much as new uses.
65
Despite early recognition of the problem posed by nonconforming uses,
options for addressing the problem were limited due to the constitutional
rights of nonconforming-use owners.
Beginning with the landmark Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon decision
in 1922,66 the Supreme Court has recognized that even in the absence of a
physical occupation of property, a regulation that goes too far in restricting
a landowner's use constitutes a compensable regulatory taking. Thus, the
application of a zoning ordinance to terminate a lawful, existing use without
compensation would constitute an unjust taking by the government if the
ordinance substantially diminished the property's value. 67 Although some
early zoning advocates argued that little theoretical difference existed
between the power to terminate future uses and existing uses,68 such
arguments advocating the retroactive application of zoning ordinances
carried little weight in judicial and political arenas.69
B. Restrictions on Nonconforming Uses
The result of this theoretical and practical conundrum was a
compromise of sorts, one not unlike that which evolved in the Clean Air
65. 7 id. § 41.01[2], at 41-6 to -7 (footnote omitted); see also Gordon Whitnall, Abatement of
Nonconforming Uses, Lecture Before the Second Annual Institute on Planning and Zoning at the
Southwestern Legal Foundation (Oct. 26-28, 1961), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1961 INSTITUTE ON
PLANNING AND ZONING 131, 134 (Southwestern Legal Found. ed., 1961) (noting that
"conformity... is sought as a means of preventing conflicts that would depreciate the desirability
and value of property for certain uses because of the intrusion of noncompatible forms of use").
66. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For a general discussion of landmark regulatory takings cases, see
SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 11.
67 See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Atlantic Beach, 467 So. 2d 751, 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(upholding the constitutional rights of a nonconforming-use owner); Redfeam v. Creppel, 455 So.
2d 1356 (La. 1984) (same); Bachman v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 494 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 1985) (same),
68. See, e.g., 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.02[2], at 41-6; Babcock, supra note 63, at 25
(stating that "[tihe landowner's expectation that he will able to build a factory on his vacant land
is not fundamentally different from his expectation that he can continue to operate his existing
factory, and both expectations should be subject to the same constitutional standards").
The power to terminate future uses, or zoning, was itself the subject of constitutional
objections, which were rejected by the Supreme Court in the landmark case Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding ordinances regulating future uses as a proper
exercise of the state's police power). For a general discussion of this issue, see ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2000).
69. See 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.01[2], at 41-6; see also Comment, Retroactive Zoning
Ordinances, 39 YALE L.J. 735, 737 (1930) (discussing the unpopularity of retroactive application
of zoning ordinances).
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Act and its subsequent amendments. While nonconforming uses would be
allowed to continue due to the constitutional rights of their owners,
regulators could impose statutory provisions designed to bring about the
gradual termination of protected nonconforming-use status. Such
restrictions included prohibitions on "[s]ubstantial physical changes which
extend or prolong the life of nonconforming uses." 70 As the Connecticut
Supreme Court noted, capturing the prevailing judicial acceptance of such
restrictions:
[T]he nonconforming use should, consistently with the property
rights of the individuals affected and substantial justice, be reduced
to conformity as quickly as possible. The general method of
accomplishing this end is to prevent any increase in the
nonconformity and eventually to lessen and do away with the
nonconforming use.7
However, even in the land-use context, the definition of a "substantial"
change to the nonconforming use has proven a contentious one. Many
courts have found that "while nonconforming uses must be contained so as
to be consonant with the spirit of a unified zoning plan, a change which is
de minimis would not be detrimental. 7 z While courts vary in their
definitions of substantial changes, courts generally allow ordinary repairs,
maintenance, and minor alterations.73
70. See 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.01[5], at 41-23 (footnote omitted). Other provisions
designed to terminate nonconforming uses included those that prohibited extensive rebuilding of
nonconforming uses after fires or natural disasters, the resumption of nonconforming uses after
discontinuance for a certain period of time, and changes to a different nonconforming use. 7 id.
§ 41.01[5], at 41-24 to -25.
71. Beerwort v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 137 A.2d 756, 758 (Conn. 1958); see also Baird v.
Bradley, 240 P.2d 1016 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (upholding an ordinance that prohibited
alterations to nonconforming buildings in excess of fifty percent of value unless they conformed
to all of the requirements for new buildings); Bird v. City of Colorado Springs, 489 P.2d 324
(Colo. 1971) (holding that a zoning ordinance may restrict a landowner's right to enlarge and/or
extend a nonconforming use); Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., Inc., 179 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1944) (holding that replacing decayed wooden walls with brick walls on a nonconforming
milk plant in a residential neighborhood constituted an unlawful alteration).
72. 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.03[2], at 41-67.
73. See, e.g., Crawford v. Bldg. Inspector, 248 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 1969). A test for
"substantiality" used by Maryland appellate courts is instructive on this point. In determining
whether an expansion should render the loss of nonconforming-use status, four criteria are
considered:
(1) to what extent does the current use of these lots reflect the nature and purpose of the
original non-conforming use; (2) is the current use merely a different manner of
utilizing the original non-conforming use or does it constitute a use different in
character, nature, and kind; (3) does the current use have a substantially different effect
upon the neighborhood; (4) is the current use a "drastic enlargement or extension" of
the original non-conforming use.
McKenny v. Baltimore County, 385 A.2d 96, 104 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
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Moreover, courts often read "natural expansion" exemptions into these
zoning restrictions. The doctrine of natural expansion in this context
prevents municipalities from prohibiting a nonconforming use simply
because of an increase in its volume of business due to a growth in
demand.74 Here again, however, a sort of purposive test has evolved, in
which courts look to see if what is "couched as a natural expansion of a
nonconforming use ... actually entails a new or different use," in which
case it can be prohibited by a municipality.7
5
The original assumption behind statutory limitations on nonconforming
uses was that such restrictions would soon lead to the gradual
disappearance of nonconforming uses. 7 6 That belief proved a misguided one
in many cases, however. In spite of restrictions on alterations and
modifications, "nonconforming uses have not only continued to exist but
have prospered.",77 Although the reasons for their continued vitality are not
perfectly clear, some scholars have speculated that "[t]he favorable,
sometimes monopolistic, position accorded them, together with municipal
requirements that all buildings meet certain standards of fitness, militates
against their elimination."
78
C. Comparing Evolutions of Doctrine: Zoning Law and the CAA
The similarities in the evolution of land-use doctrine regulating
nonconforming uses and of federal control technology standards on old
sources under the Clean Air Act are striking in many respects. Their
progression can be summarized as follows. First, a two-tiered regulatory
74. See, e.g., In re Freid-el Corp., 383 A.2d 1286 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (affirming a lower
court's holding that an owner's right to natural expansion of a nonconforming use is protected by
the Due Process Clause). For further discussion on the natural expansion exemption, see
ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 68, at 225.
75. 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.03[2], at 41-67.
76. See Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., 129 A.2d 363, 365 (Md. 1957) (noting that
at the "inception of zoning," nonconforming uses "were not regarded as serious handicaps to its
effective operation; it was felt they would be few and likely to be eliminated by the passage of
time and restrictions on their expansion" (emphasis added)).
77. See 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.04[1], at 41-147; see also Grant, 129 A.2d at 365
(describing the continued existence of nonconforming uses despite regulation restricting the
expansion and alteration of such uses); Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745, 750 (Mo. 1965)
(stating that "pre-existing lawful nonconforming uses have not faded out or eliminated themselves
as quickly as had been anticipated"); Babcock, supra note 63, at 29-30 (describing the continued
existence of nonconforming uses despite restrictions on expansion and alteration).
78. Note, Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 U. CHI. L.
REV. 477, 479 (1942); see also Grant, 129 A.2d at 365 ("Nonconforming uses have not
disappeared as hoped and anticipated because the general regulation of future uses and changes,
with some existing uses uncontrolled, have put the latter in an intrenched position often with a
value that is great-and grows-because of the artificial monopoly given it by the law."); Vill. of
Valatie v. Smith, 632 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (N.Y. 1994) ("While it was initially assumed that
nonconforming uses would disappear with time, just the opposite proved to be true in many
instances, with the nonconforming uses thriving in the absence of any new lawful competition.").
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framework is adopted, subjecting new uses or sources to regulations that are
different from those for old uses or sources, due in some measure to the
interests of fairness. Second, restrictions are put upon the preexisting uses
or sources prohibiting alterations or modifications with the purpose of
gradually eliminating their protected status. And, in both cases, such
restrictions are based on a faulty assumption that the nonconforming uses
will naturally "die out." Third, a fine-tuning of the regulatory and/or
judicial interpretations of restrictive statutes occurs in order to bring more
old uses or sources within the "new" regulatory framework. Moreover, even
particular exemptions to the restrictions, initially adopted for practical or
fairness reasons, such as the "demand growth" exemption to calculations of
emissions increases under the CAA, are mirrored in the zoning context:
e.g., the "natural growth exemption" in the elimination of nonconforming-
use status.
Perhaps in one way these nearly identical evolutions are unsurprising.
Federal technology control standards are, in one sense, a zoning ordinance
that is national is scope, prescribing the lawfully permitted use of particular
facilities throughout the United States. It makes sense, then, that the
evolution of zoning regulations in the land-use context would inform its
development. The two contexts differ in one important way, however.
Zoning regulation has incorporated a technique that has proven useful in the
elimination of certain nonconforming uses, particularly when they have
acute implications for public health, safety, or even aesthetics:
"amortization" provisions. This is one regulatory technique that has not
been incorporated into federal air pollution regulation. The development of
amortization provisions in the zoning context and an analysis of their
potential usefulness in the air pollution context will be addressed in the
following Part.
IV. AMORTIZATION AND THE TERMINATION OF NONCONFORM[NG USES
A. Amortization Provisions: An Overview
The failure of statutory limitations to bring about the gradual
disappearance of nonconforming uses led many municipalities to
experiment with a more drastic and effective technique: amortization.
Amortization regulations provide nonconforming-use owners with a
discrete period of time to continue the nonconforming use, during which the
owner can amortize or recoup her investment. After the allotted time,
however, the nonconforming use must either cease or come into compliance
with the zoning regulation.
Amortization provisions are based on "the principle that the property
owner should be given time to recoup his investment in land before being
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forced to discontinue the use without compensation." 79 In State v. Joyner, a
decision upholding the constitutionality of amortization provisions, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina made the following observation regarding
the rationale behind the amortization technique:
Municipalities which seek to terminate nonconforming uses
through amortization proceed on the assumption that the public
welfare requires that such uses cease, but that summary termination
is illegal, impractical, or unfair. They find a middle ground,
between immediate cessation of use and the indefinite continuance
thereof.... The term "amortization" is derived from the notion
that the nonconforming user can amortize his investment during the
period of permitted nonconformity. It is reasoned that this
opportunity to continue for a limited time cushions the economic
shock of the restriction, dulls the edge of poular disapproval, and
improves the prospects ofjudicial approval.
Although amortization provisions have been controversial throughout
their use, they have been fairly common since the 1950s and have been
upheld by a majority of U.S. courts, both state and federal, provided that the
adopted time periods are "reasonable." 8 1 The time period established by
amortization regulations varies depending on the type of land or structure
involved in the nonconforming use. The range is generally from "a few
months or years (as in the case of billboards) up to fifty or sixty years (for
very substantial structures). 82 Moreover, it is usually the complaining party
that has the burden of proving that an amortization period is unreasonable.
83
79. 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.04[1], at 41-148.
80. State v. Joyner, 211 S.E.2d 320, 324 (N.C. 1975) (emphasis added, internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
81. See 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.04[1], at 41-152. A minority of courts, however, have
refused to uphold amortizations on the grounds that such provisions are not authorized by the
zoning enabling act of the state. See State v. Bates, 305 N.W.2d 426 (Iowa 1981) (holding that the
enactment of a county zoning ordinance eliminating nonconforming uses was beyond the
authorization of Iowa Code § 358A.3); ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 68, at 22-23 ("Dissenters
from the majority view augment their constitutional and authority arguments with dire predictions
that amortization of nonconforming uses will deter investment by putting any landowner's
reasonable expectations at risk and will result in deterioration as owners refuse to maintain their
properties."). For further discussion, see, for example, Craig A. Peterson & Claire McCarthy,
Amortization of Legal Land Use Nonconformities as Regulatory Takings: An Uncertain Future,
35 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 37, 37 (1989) (explaining that "state courts have generally
upheld amortization provisions since the 1950's").
82. 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.04[], at 41-148; see also Richard P. Holme, Billboards
and On-Premise Signs: Regulation and Elimination Under the Fifth Amendment, Lecture Before
the Institute on Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain at the Southwestern Legal Foundation
(Nov. 7-9, 1973), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT
DOMAIN 247, 283-91 (Southwestern Legal Found. ed., 1974).
83. 7 ROHAN, supra note 12, § 41.04[1], at 41-152.
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While there is no "fixed formula for determining what constitutes a
reasonable period,,1 4 courts generally make this determination in one of
two ways. The "test most commonly employed by courts... is based upon
a balancing of public good against private loss." 85 For instance, a California
appellate court in City of Los Angeles v. Gage upheld an amortization plan
as reasonable, finding that "[a] legislative body may well conclude that the
beneficial effect on the community of the eventual elimination of all
nonconforming uses... more than offsets individual 
loSses. ''6
Understandably, the ambiguities and judicial discretion inherent in such a
balancing test have made it the object of scholarly attack. 7
Alternatively, courts make a determination of reasonableness based on
the length of the amortization period relative to the owner's investment.
88
This type of analysis, in which courts use the depreciation for income tax
purposes in order to measure whether the owner will be able to recoup her
original investment, was upheld by the Supreme Court of California in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,89 one of the pivotal cases regarding
billboard amortization, which I will discuss further in the following Section.
This type of judicial formula for "reasonableness" has also garnered
criticism, however, due in part to the formula's particular evolution. The
"recoupment of investment" calculation in determining a reasonable
amortization provision was not a natural outgrowth of the amortization
concept. In the infant stages of the application of amortization provisions to
land-use regulation, municipalities based the amortization period on a
84. Viii. ofVatalie v. Smith, 632 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (N.Y. 1994).
85. Bd. of Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Iowa 1969); see also Vill. of Oak
Park v. Gordon, 205 N.E.2d 464, 466 (1I. 1965) (invalidating a zoning ordinance establishing
amortization provisions for nonconforming rooming, boarding, and lodging houses under the
public interest/private loss balancing test); McKinney v. Riley, 197 A.2d 218, 222 (N.H. 1964)
(upholding an amortization provision requiring termination of a nonconforming use of land for a
junkyard upon balancing public interest against private loss).
A minority of courts have ruled, however, that amortization provisions are per se
unconstitutional, even if they are "reasonable." See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745
(Mo. 1965) (invalidating a six-year amortization period for the termination of a nonconforming
use as an unjustified exercise of the police power).
86. 274 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
87. See Michael M. Berger, Amortization as "Just Compensation": If It Works for Billboards,
Can Office Buildings Be Far Behind?, Lecture Before the Institute on Planning, Zoning and
Eminent Domain at the Southwestern Legal Foundation (Nov. 20-22, 1991), in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 7-1, 7-7 (Carol J. Holgren ed.,
1992).
88. See, e.g., Art Neon Co. v. City of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 123 (10th Cit. 1973) (suggesting
that an owner's investment should be used as a factor to determine reasonableness of an
amortization period); City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 779 (Tex. 1972)
(same).
89. 610 P.2d 407 (Cal. 1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); see also Christine Venezia,
Comment, Looking Back: The Full-Time Baseline in Regulatory Takings Analysis, 24 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 199 (1996) (discussing the use of the recoupment of investment analysis).
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determination of the actual useful life remainirng for a given land use.9 0
Because the term "amortization" was borrowed from a technique in tax
accounting, in which businesses were allowed to compensate for the loss in
usefulness of their property by deducting that loss from their taxes, basing
the amortization period on actual useful life seemed a natural and proper
extension of the concept into the land-use arena. 91 Thus, several older
amortization cases required that a reasonable amortization provision bear a
relationship to the actual useful life of the nonconforming use.
92
Over time, however, the requirement of an amortization period's link to
an actual useful life calculation became increasingly rare in judicial
analysis. Viewing the conceptual replacement of "actual useful life" with
"recoupment of investment" in light of the Supreme Court's pivotal
regulatory takings decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City,93 one begins to see the merits of scholarly takings criticism on
this score. 94 In Penn Central, the Court declared that the determination of
whether a regulation amounts to a taking depends, among other things, on
the property owner's "distinct investment-backed expectations.,, 95 It is
indeed questionable that a recoupment of the original investment in and of
itself satisfies a property owner's distinct investment-backed expectation.
Even a reasonable investment-backed expectation would likely include an
expectation of profits above and beyond the original investment itself, for it
is unlikely that one would embark on such an investment solely with the
intent or expectation of recouping that investment. And yet, a determination
of an amortization period's reasonableness based on a recoupment of
investment rests on the plausibility of such an assumption. Then again, it is
entirely plausible that the investment-backed expectation of an investor
would also include the possible risk of losing one's investment. Thus,
perhaps the "recoupment of investment" test of reasonableness is more
closely aligned with the ex ante expectations of an investor than critics
suggest.
90. See Joseph A. Katarincic, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, Buildings and Structures
by Amortization-Concept Versus Law, 2 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1963); Samuel B. Hickman, Note,
Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 450, 453 (1959).
91. See Berger, supra note 87, at 7-7.
92. See, e.g., City of La Mesa v. Tweed & Gambrell Planing Mill, 304 P.2d 803, 808 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (finding that a five-year amortization period for a building with a useful life
of twenty-one years is not reasonable).
93. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
94. For a rather scathing criticism of this conceptual replacement, see Berger, supra note 87,
at 7-18 to -22,
95. 438 U.S. at 127.
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B. Billboard Regulation and the "Amortization Compensation Equation"
Finally, a subtler, but nonetheless noteworthy, line of analysis that
recurs in several judicial rulings on the "reasonableness" of amortization
provisions is what I will term the amortization-compensation equation.
Although not a clearly recognized judicial test for reasonableness in the
manner of "balancing public good against private loss" or "recoupment of
investment," the amortization-compensation equation is nevertheless a line
of analysis that has often played an important role in the validation of
amortization provisions. This approach suggests that the monopolistic
position afforded to owners of nonconforming uses96 during the
amortization period itself may amount to a type of compensation for future
loss, sufficient to survive takings challenges. For instance, the Gage court
made the following observation:
Use of a reasonable amortization scheme provides an equitable
means of reconciliation of the conflicting interests in satisfaction of
due process requirements.... The loss [the owner] suffers, if any,
is spread out over a period of years, and he enjoys a monopolistic
position by virtue of the zoning ordinance as long as he remains.97
Although such a line of analysis lends additional support to the general
constitutionality of the amortization technique, the use and development of
the amortization-compensation equation has seen both its apex and decline
in the context of billboard regulation. Since the introduction of the Highway
Beautification Act of 1965,98 which pushed states to develop programs
restricting new billboard construction and to remove existing,
nonconforming billboards within "federal corridors," 99 local and state
programs limiting billboards have been "one of America's most litigated
forms of land-use regulation."100  The Act provides that "[j]ust
compensation shall be paid upon the removal of any outdoor advertising
sign, display, or device lawfully erected,"' '1 where removal came as a result
96. Such a "monopolistic" position generally occurs in the context of a change from a
commercial use district to a residential district, when the nonconforming use is allowed to
continue.
97. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (emphasis
added).
98. Pub. L. No. 89-285, § 101, 79 Stat. 1028, 1028 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 131
(2000)). The impetus for billboard control emerged in the 1960s as a response to the "proliferation
of billboards in suburban and rural America." ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND-USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 426
(1999).
99. Federal corridors are designated areas "within 660 feet of interstate and federally funded
primary highways." MELTZ ET AL., supra note 98, at 426.
100. Id. at 427.
101. 23 U.S.C. § 131(g).
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of the Act. The determination of just compensation, however, was left
largely to states until 1978, at which point Congress amended the statute.
Between 1965 and 1978, amortization provisions were commonly used
by states in the regulation of billboards. 10 2 Significantly, in this period, it
was the very inclusion of amortization provisions combined with a greater
judicial acceptance of the amortization-compensation equation that saved
much billboard regulation from unjust takings rulings. As one commentator
notes:
From a legal perspective, the existence of an amortization
component allows government defenders of billboards programs to
argue that such programs don't cause an economic "wipeout" that
would trigger the Lucas, virtual per se rule of takings liability;
instead, the program can be characterized as one that limits
economic return and therefore falls under Penn Central's ad hoc,
balancing approach.
1 0 3
The relationship between the inclusion of amortization provisions and the
upholding of billboard regulation is documented in numerous cases.104 The
overriding theme in such cases is the equating of amortization with just
compensation. Namely, the monopolistic existence of a nonconforming use
within a grace period was itse/f regarded as tantamount to compensation.
In 1978, a pivotal amendment was added to the Highway Beautification
Act "requiring compensation" for removal of billboards within 660 feet of
interstate or primary highways regardless of the existence of an
amortization period. 0 5 This amendment has been widely acknowledged as
a concession to the well-mobilized, politically potent billboard lobby.
10 6
The passage of this amendment has frustrated the attempts of states and
municipalities to carry out effective billboard regulation. 10 7 Moreover, as
102. Most state and local programs that impose limitations on billboards have replicated the
amortization provisions in the Highway Beautification Act. See MELTZ ET AL., supra note 98, at
433.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 177 (4th Cir.
1988) ("The allowance of an amortization period.., is one of the facts that the district court
should consider in defining the character of governmental action, which is the third factor
mentioned in Penn Central."); Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency v. King, 285 Cal. Rptr. 335, 351
(Ct. App. 1991) ("[A]n ordinance prohibiting existing billboards may be enforced as a
constitutionally valid exercise of the state's police power which does not require compensation if
a reasonable amortization period for discontinuance of use is provided."); Newman Signs, Inc. v.
Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 757-58 (N.D. 1978) ("The North Dakota Act also provides within its
statutory scheme an amortization period during which a sign owner is allowed to maintain his sign
without its being subject to removal. This type of provision is common in many States and has
been upheld against constitutional attack.").
105. See Charles F. Floyd, The Takings Issue in Billboard Control, 3 WASH. U. L. & POL'Y
357, 375 (2000).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 375-78.
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discussed below, it has also led to increased, and oftentimes grudgingly
administered, judicial scrutiny of the amortization technique in the
elimination of nonconforming uses.
The opinion of the California Supreme Court in Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego10 8 provides a fascinating illustration of judicial
willingness to validate the "amortization as compensation" rationale absent
legislative interference in the billboard context. In this case, the court
upheld a San Diego ordinance requiring abatement of all off-site billboards
(within 500 feet of freeways or scenic highways) following a 90-day
amortization period. The court broke with earlier findings that amortization
provisions of less than a year for billboards were "generally
unreasonable,"'10 9 and reasoned that the city's justification for the
amortization periods was "not facially unreasonable."" 0
This provision [of 90 days] is based on the fact that such signs were
rendered nonconforming uses by prior city zoning ordinances.
Since those prior zoning ordinances had been in force for about 3
years before the effective date of Ordinance No. 10795, the signs in
question received an actual amortization period of at least 3 years
and 90 days.' 1
Thus, in this ruling, the court not only accepted the amortization-
compensation equation in its reasoning but also suggested a potentially
stronger interpretation of it: So long as the regulated entity is aware of its
nonconforming-use status, its existence during that period, even before
amortization provisions are introduced, could be considered as part of the
compensation "package" for takings analysis.
The opinion of the California Supreme Court in Metromedia, however,
stands not only for the highpoint of judicial acceptance of the amortization-
compensation equation but also for the formula's legislatively mandated
decline in the billboard context." 2 While liberal in its interpretation of
provisions regarding the removal of billboards untouched by the Act, the
California Supreme Court paradoxically concluded that the "Highway
108. 610 P.2d 407 (Cal. 1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). The San Diego ordinance was
found unconstitutional on its face by the Supreme Court as an abridgement of protected,
noncommercial speech. Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. 490. Potential "takings" issues regarding the
reasonableness of amortization provisions werc not considered by the Supreme Court in this case,
however.
109. Metromedia, Inc., 610 P.2d at 427 (citing various previous cases).
110. Id. at 428. The court notes, however, that its "conclusion that the amortization schedule
established in the San Diego ordinance is not facially unreasonable does not demonstrate its
validity as applied to each of plaintiffs' signs. The reasonableness of an amortization period as
applied to each billboard depends in part upon facts peculiar to that structure." Id. (citations
omitted).
111. Id. at 427.
112. See Floyd, supra note 105, at 375-78.
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Beautification Act as amended requires the payment of compensation for
removal of all billboards existing... on November 6, 1978, located within
660feet offederal interstate or primary highways."' 13 The court, however,
pointedly noted, "We reach that conclusion reluctantly, since its effect in
this case and in future cases will probably frustrate the original intent of the
Highway Beautification Act." 114 Thus, Metromedia provides two important
insights. First, it demonstrates the potential willingness of courts to adopt
the amortization-as-compensation rationale, particularly when the contested
use has existed, and its owner has been aware of its nonconforming-use
status, for a significant period of time prior to the amortization period.
Secondly, this case suggests that any decline in the validity of amortization
without compensation in the billboard context has been a result of
legislative fiat and is often read narrowly and applied grudgingly by state
courts. 115
Lest the proponents of amortization begin celebrating too early,
however, the example posed by billboard regulation is sobering in that it
also demonstrates the inability of the amortization-compensation equation
to withstand the fruits of successful lobbying efforts: legislation expressly
mandating compensation. Thus, while this Note has focused on the
potential usefulness of borrowing land-use concepts in the regulation of air
pollution, it must also be acknowledged that air pollution regulation is
subject to similar political constraints as its land-use counterpart-intense,
and oftentimes successful, opposition by regulated entities. The purpose of
this Note, however, is not to explore the politics of air pollution regulation
so much as to analogize its evolution to that of land-use doctrine in order to
shine a skeptical light on one problematic justification for continued
grandfathering: takings.
V. AMORTIZATION AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM POSED BY
OLD UTILITIES: CALLING FOR A LEGISLATIVE RESUSCITATION OF THE
AMORTIZATION COMPENSATION EQUATION
Coal-burning utilities built prior to the original CAA remain a potent
threat to the nation's air pollution goals. The framers of the Act, who
predicted the gradual disappearance of old stationary sources, have been
proven wrong, and, perversely, it has been the continuation of a two-tiered
113. Metromedia, Inc., 610 P.2d at 425 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. See Frank Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14-15 (1984) (discussing why judges should construe
"rent-seeking" statutes in as narrow a manner as possible). Easterbrook states that "a
judge.., implements the bargain as a faithful agent but without enthusiasm; asked to extend the
scope of a back-room deal, he refuses unless the proof of the deal's scope is compelling." Id.
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system of control technology requirements first established in the original
CAA that has allowed these factories to avoid a "natural death." It is thus
imperative to reassess the motivations behind continued grandfathering of
old sources, and to look toward solutions that have proven useful in
eliminating and/or bringing nonconforming entities into compliance in
conceptually similar areas of regulation.
In the following Section, I suggest the use of amortization provisions as
a potential solution to the continued emissions problem posed by coal-
burning electric utilities built prior to the Clean Air Act of 1970. I propose a
legislative incorporation of amortization provisions into the CAA,
mandating the imposition of best available control technology by a fixed
date, which would replace NSR and PSD in the treatment of control
technology requirements for grandfathered electric utilities, as a viable
strategy. Moreover, I will suggest that it is a solution preferable to proposed
alternatives and one that carries a new urgency given recent interpretive
changes announced by the Bush EPA, which threaten to further cement the
"old-new" divide in air pollution regulation. Finally, I suggest a way of
understanding this plan in light of the ongoing debate between proponents
of command-and-control regimes and more "finely tuned" regulatory
strategies.
A. Replacing NSR and PSD with a Uniform System ofAmortization
Provisions for Old Electric Utilities
In light of the failure of the New Source Review and Prevention of
Significant Deterioration programs to bring many old sources within the
ambit of stricter control technology requirements, the following plan poses
a potential solution. While the NSR and PSD programs should continue to
deal with the permitting of new sources in attainment and nonattainment
areas, insofar as the "major modification" language has been unsuccessful
in narrowing the old-new source divide, it should be replaced with a
uniform system of amortization provisions for old, coal-burning utilities to
comply with BACT 1 6 requirements by a set date or face shutdown for
noncompliance. Although this Note attempts to suggest the potential of the
amortization technique at a general level rather than to offer specific details
on the mechanics of such a program, a few points are worth mentioning.
They concern the feasibility and effectiveness of applying this land-use
technique to coal-burning utilities constructed before passage of the 1970
CAA.
116. Although new sources in nonattainment areas are required to meet LAER, an even more
stringent requirement than BACT, this is perhaps an area where there needs to be a bit of
flexibility toward old sources, at least for an interim period, depending on political considerations
and the costs of implementation.
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In the case of electric utilities, because they exist in a finite and
identifiable number, setting amortization provisions for such facilities,
either individually or en masse, according to their size, generating capacity,
and year in which they were built, would be administratively feasible.
117
Moreover, such a program would eliminate certain problems that frequently
occur under the NSR and PSD programs. Such problems include the
nonreporting or misreporting of "major modifications" and the invocation
of the "demand-growth" exclusion by old sources to escape stricter control
technology requirements. 1
8
Also, a great deal of potential exists for shared state responsibility in
the administration of such an amortization program.' 19 While guidelines for
"reasonable" amortization provisions for old, coal-burning facilities,
perhaps varying on the basis of size, generating capacity, and year of
construction, could be set by the EPA, state agencies could share
responsibility for administering and enforcing such guidelines as well as for
addressing the special circumstances of individual plants, for example, by
hearing petitions for variances. However, it is important to address one
particular consideration, without which even the idea of an amortization
program for old electric utilities would become impotent as a practical
matter: choosing effective chronological baselines.
At the theoretical and constitutional level, applying the idea of
amortization to control technology requirements for old electric utilities
seems like a valid proposition. As a practical matter, however, it is
important to note that amortization for big structures has become all but
nonexistent in the zoning context. Municipalities commonly limit the
application of the amortization technique to a nonconforming use where
there has been little substantial investment in the regulated entity. The
reason for this limitation is rooted more in practical constraints than in
theoretical or constitutional ones. During the 1950s, several major cities in
the United States adopted amortization provisions for a wide range of
117. Extensive information is already available on the number and location of electric utility
plants in the United States, as well as their construction dates, size, generating capacity, and
contribution to total pollution in a given region. For example, the Southern Environmental Law
Center "reported that in the eight states in the Southeast United States there are about 375 power
plants, but the twelve worst polluters who generate 17% of the region's electric power contribute
31% of the region's SO2 emissions and 44% of the region's NO.." Reitze, supra note 3, at 385.
Moreover, while this Note focuses on the problem posed by electric utilities, there is no reason
why a program of amortization could not be useful in dealing with other problematic stationary
sources as well, such as those in the wood products sector.
118. See supra Section II.C.
119. This is particularly important because some states already have stricter pollution-control
requirements in place for grandfathered plants than are currently mandated by federal regulations.
For example, Texas requires grandfathered plants to reduce NO, emissions by fifty percent and
SO 2 emissions by twenty-five percent. The issue of state/federal coordination thus becomes even
more important. TEx. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39,264 (Vernon Supp. 2002); see also Karen Masterson
& Dina Cappiello, Industry Pollution Eased by Bush, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 23, 2002, at A 1.
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industrial and commercial structures. Because of the sizeable investments
involved, however, the adopted amortization periods based on a
"reasonable investment-backed expectations" theory were incredibly long,
ranging in some cases from forty to sixty years. 120 This led several
municipalities to abandon the idea of amortization provisions for major
structures altogether.
This is where the idea of the amortization-compensation equation
suggested in Metromedia becomes a particularly useful and necessary
device. To satisfy the "investment-backed expectations" guideline in setting
a "reasonable" amortization period, it becomes necessary to choose a
chronological baseline. 2 ' Namely, in fixing a reasonable amortization
period, does the administrator choose a "full-time" baseline, which looks
back to the original time of purchase of the entity to determine the potential
impact of a regulation on the owner's investment-backed expectations, or
an "aftermath-time" baseline, which starts the clock, so to speak, at the time
the regulation takes effect? The question boils down to the following: Does
one look at the owner's expectations on the day she bought the property or
on the day the regulation that renders it a "nonconforming" use is passed?
Clearly, the aftermath-time baseline puts the owner in a much more
favorable position because her investment-backed expectations on the day
the regulation is enacted would necessitate a thirty- or forty-year
amortization period from that day. 22 If an amortization period is decided
upon with a full-time baseline in mind, however, then it seems entirely
120. Margaret Collins, Methods of Determining Amortization Periods of Non-Conforming
Uses, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 215, 230 (2000).
121. See Venezia, supra note 89, at 200.
122. Id. Venezia presents the following useful scenario as an illustration of how the choice of
baseline can affect a consideration of a regulation's impact on the owner's investment-backed
expectations:
Jim, a developer, buys for $100,000 fifty acres near a lake for the
purpose of building summer homes on the land. Jim develops thirty-five
acres, building seventy summer homes at a cost of $3.6 million. He then sells
the homes for $7 million, giving him an overall profit of $3.4 million. A
regulation, zoning the land as protected wetlands, then prevents Jim from
developing the remaining fifteen acres. Although he could have developed
the remaining land at a profit of approximately $1.5 million, Jim's fifteen
acres are now valued at a little over $10,000, with no potential for greater
profit.
In such a case, if a court were to choose to measure the effect of the regulation against
the investor's expectations on the day before the regulation took effect, the court
probably would find that the regulation had "wiped out" Jim's investment. If, on the
other hand, the court shifts its focus to a full-time baseline and begins its inquiry when
Jim made his investment, the result is much different. Jim made $3.4 million in profit
on a S 100,000 investment. ... Although he did not realize all of his potential profit, Jim
was able to make ... a reasonable return on his investment. By providing a more
complete picture of the owner's investment history in the property, the full-time
baseline reveals that the owner largely achieved his investment-backed expectation,
thereby undercutting arguments about unconstitutional takings ....
Id. at 200-01.
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plausible that an owner of an electric utility built prior to the 1970 CAA has
more likely than not recouped her original investment. Thus, using a full-
time baseline, a "reasonable" amortization period could be relatively short,
and facilities could be brought into compliance in a practical, effective, yet
nonetheless fair time frame.
Moreover, in the context of old, coal-burning utilities, the view of
amortization as Metromedia-style compensation has increased validity. It
has been the very promulgation of bifurcated control technology
requirements that has extended the natural lives of these old plants,
conferring upon them a false competitive advantage and creating within the
owner expectations of the original investment that might not have been
there originally, at the time a pre-1970 plant was built. 123 This is all the
more reason to adopt amortization periods that incorporate the notion that
these plants became "nonconforming" in the truest (though not technical)
sense of the word in 1970, the year the old-new divide was set in place.
Seen in such a light, amortization of these major structures seems
practicable. The existence of lenient control technology requirements over
the past thirty years would itself be regarded as a form of compensation,
allowing for the promulgation of amortization periods of a brief enough
length to satisfy the nation's air pollution goals in a timely manner. In this
way, one can conceive of these sources being brought into compliance
within a few years of a new "amortization" regulation being passed rather
than within a few decades.
B. Benefits ofAmortization over Current Approaches:
Administrative Rulemaking Efforts and Ad Hoc Inclusion
Under the "Major Modification" Umbrella
An amendment mandating the amortization of "nonconforming"
electric utilities, which would result in the un-grandfathering of old sources
in the electric utility sector, is also preferable to the administrative
rulemaking and enforcement efforts that have arisen in the past decade and
that have generated much political controversy. In the absence of effective
legislation designed to bring more old sources within the purview of stricter
control technology requirements, there have been various efforts in recent
years to achieve similar results via administrative rulemaking and federal
and state enforcement initiatives. Upon pressure from industry and
environmental advocacy groups, the EPA under President Clinton
established the Clean Air Act Advisory Subcommittee on NSR Reform in
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1996 and proposed various changes to the NSR program. 24 The proposed
reforms, however, were never finalized, and subsequent efforts to reform
the NSR program under the Clinton Administration were unsuccessful.1
25
By 1998, an EPA clearly determined to narrow the old-new divide
sought to achieve its goals for NSR program revision through alternate
means.126 By reinterpreting the regulatory definition of a "major
modification" to old stationary sources, 27 the Clinton Administration EPA
began a series of NSR enforcement initiatives against the electric utility
industry, with the goals of extracting civil penalties and, even more
significantly, to impose stricter emissions-control requirements. 128 New
interpretations of the term "major modification" broke with the agency's
former interpretations of NSR rules in a variety of ways.
First, the new interpretations essentially eliminated the demand growth
exclusion, which had previously allowed electric utilities to "disregard
coincidental emission increases resulting from other factors such as growth
in electricity demand" in assessing whether a physical or operational
change to a plant resulted in a "significant net emissions increase"
sufficient to trigger NSR rules. 129 Whereas prior interpretations included a
causation component, in which NSR rules could be avoided by showing
that the cause of the emissions increase was natural growth rather than the
physical or operation change itself, the new interpretations eliminated the
causation component. Instead, the EPA adopted the assumption that any
emissions increase following such a change "can ultimately be tied to and
must be due to that particular physical or operational change."'
130
Moreover, the new interpretations attempted to restrict the routine
maintenance exemption to cover only those activities "not unusual in the
life of a given unit," '' a reading much narrower than the EPA's previous
case-by-case evaluations, which took into consideration whether the
124. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source
Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,249 (proposed July 23, 1996).
125. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 51, at 203.
126. Id.
127. For a discussion of the term "major modification," see supra notes 35-45 and
accompanying text. Under NSR, facilities may not make "major modifications" without first
obtaining the appropriate NSR permits and installing the requisite emissions-control technology-
i.e., BACT if located in an attainment area and LAER if located in a nonattainment area. See
supra Section ll.B.
128. See Armstrong, supra note 51, at 203; see also Elliot Elder & Robin L. Juni, Has EPA
Fired Up Utilities To Clear the Air?, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 8, 9 (2000) (discussing NSR
enforcement initiatives). EPA enforcement initiatives were also directed against the wood
products and petroleum refining industries.
129. Armstrong, supra note 51, at 204.
130. Id.
131. In re Tenn. Valley Auth., No. CAA-2000-04-008, 2000 WL 1358648, at *27 (Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Sept. 15, 2000).
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activity was routinely undertaken at facilities throughout the industry.1 32
Armed with these new interpretations, the EPA filed lawsuits against eight
major utilities in November 1999 for failure to comply with NSR
permitting requirements. 133 The EPA under the Bush Administration
promised to continue these initial lawsuits, but recently announced its
intention to abandon the reinterpretation of "major modification" adopted
by the previous Administration.1
34
The enforcement initiative approach has been lauded by some,
particularly political leaders of Northeastern states that have long borne the
brunt of "traveling" air pollution from other states.t 35 It has also generated
harsh criticism, however, from those who believe the enforcement actions
to be an unjustifiable effort by the EPA to circumvent the traditional
administrative rulemaking process under the guise of "reinterpreting"
existing rules.' 36 The traditional rulemaking process under the APA
requires "(1) publication of the proposed rule in the Federal Register; (2)
agency receipt of comments from interested persons; and (3) publication of
the final rule along with a statement of basis and purpose for the rule."'
137
Clearly, none of these requirements is met in the enforcement measures,
and absent the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, challenges to the
Clinton EPA's reinterpretation of NSR rules can only be brought through
132. See Kevin A. Gaynor & Benjamin S. Lippard, Environmental Enforcement: Industry
Should Not Be Complacent, 32 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,488, 10,491 (2002).
133. Gaynor and Lippard go on to say:
Seven companies were initially sued in various federal courts, while the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) was sued administratively. To date, one utility has settled its
lawsuit with EPA (Tampa Electric Company). Other utilities (Cinergy and Virginia
Power, which was not sued in the initial round of 1999 lawsuits) have reached
"agreements in principle" with EPA, which, despite the passage of many months, still
have not resulted in final consent decrees. However, on January 23, 2002, EPA
announced it lodged a consent decree with a New Jersey utility (PSEG) covering
alleged NSR violations.
The TVA administrative hearing is concluded, and the EPA Environmental
Appeals Board (EAB) rendered a decision supporting EPA's position in the
enforcement initiative; the TVA is appealing the EAB's decision before the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit....
Finally, six utilities are still actively and aggressively challenging EPA's claims
(these utilities are American Electric Power, FirstEnergy, Duke Power, Illinois Power,
Southern Company, and the Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company (SIGECO)).
See id. at 10,489-90 (footnotes omitted). For more information about the complaints themselves,
EPA press releases regarding the complaints, and statements of then-EPA Administrator Browner,
see Envtl. Prot. Agency, EnvironSen$e, at http://es.epa.gov/compliance/civi/programs/caalcoal/
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
134. Matthew L. Wald, E.PA. Says It Will Change Rules Governing Industrial Pollution,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2002, at A l ("The announcement of the rules triggered a storm of criticism
from environmentalists, Democrats, and some Republicans.").
135. See Zaffrann, supra note 57, at 59; see also Editorial, Rollback on Clean Air, N.Y.
TiMEs, Jan. 9, 2002, at A22.
136. See Elder & Juni, supra note 128, at 10-11.
137. Armstrong, supra note 51, at 205; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (2000) (listing the
requirements of the administrative rulemaking process).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2582 [Vol. 112: 2553
Billboards and Big Utilities
litigation. Moreover, this retroactive enforcement approach has earned
criticism for violating various rule-of-law considerations embodied in the
APA, particularly the doctrine of fair notice.
1 38
In a radical break with the policy of the previous Administration, the
Bush Administration EPA recently proposed new rules that would allow
grandfathered electric power plants and refineries to "change operations
under a broader definition of routine maintenance.' '139 The current EPA
claims that this change of policy is motivated not only by "rule of law"
concerns, but by a belief that the existing NSR program discourages old
plants from modernizing their facilities for fear of coming under the "major
modification" umbrella and its accompanying federal scrutiny.140 If these
are the true motivations behind the Bush Administration's environmental
"reform" plan, rather than pure, unabashed rent-seeking behavior,141 then
such a gigantic step backward from the Clinton-era enforcement actions
only seems justified if it is replaced by a genuine and deliberative
legislative effort to achieve an un-grandfathering of old, coal-burning
sources in a way that is fair to regulated parties, effective, and consistent
with the original intentions behind the regulation of stationary sources
under the Clean Air Act. A legislative restructuring of the NSR/PSD
framework, which would incorporate amortization provisions for old
electric utilities to become conforming-i.e., to meet the control technology
standards of their new source counterparts-by a date reflective of the
advantageous status held by these plants for the past thirty years, poses just
such a solution.
138. See, e.g., Jason Nichols, Note, "Sorry! What the Regulation Really Means Is...
Administrative Agencies' Ability To Alter an Existing Regulatory Landscape Through
Reinterpretation of Rules, 80 TEx. L. REv. 951 (2002). The author notes that while administrative
interpretive rules are not necessarily subject to the fair notice doctrine, as opposed to legislative
rules by agencies that do require notice under § 553 of the APA, a "complete interpretive turn-
around... following decades of industry reliance" may certainly trigger a higher fair notice
standard. Id. at 976.
139. See Masterson & Cappiello, supra note 119.
140. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 134.
141. These actions have already generated immense criticism on a variety of fronts. A
particularly damning aspect of the new rules is their intended implementation absent any
replacement plan. The recently proposed "Clear Skies" initiative, which focuses on the use of
market strategies like tradable emissions credits to achieve reductions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxide, and mercury emissions from power plants, would not fully be in effect for another fifteen
years at least, and even then, its likely impact on grandfathered plants is uncertain. See Sierra
Club, Clean Air: Facts About the Bush Administration's Plan To Weaken the Clean Air Act, at
http://www.sierraclub.org/cleanair/clear skies.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2003) (describing the
details and deficiencies of the "Clear Skies" proposal). Even the most generous observer would be
hard-pressed to view this as a "clean hands" rules change.
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C. Amortization as a First-Line Strategy: Anticipating the
Command-and-Control Critics
This Note has thus far relied on one giant assumption: the continued
legitimacy of technology-based standards as a regulatory approach toward
air pollution. The problem presented in this Note has been that of
incorporating more old sources within a stricter control technology regime.
But this begs the overarching question of whether air pollution regulation
should continue down this path, or, as its critics suggest, shift toward
alternate approaches, such as cost-benefit-based standards or market
approaches. This Section will provide a brief overview of the arguments of
both the proponents and critics of technology-based standards as well as a
description of how the amortization plan advocated in this Note should be
understood within the context of the larger debate regarding "command-
and-control" approaches to regulation.
The most common criticisms of technology-based standards, notably
argued by Professors Ackerman, Stewart, and Sunstein,142 can be
summarized as follows. First, technology-based controls are not cost-
effective, for their insistence on national uniformity fails to take account of
the "variations among plants and industries in the cost of reducing
pollution," as well as "geographic variations in pollution effects.'
143
Moreover, technology-based standards create disincentives for the
"development of new, environmentally superior strategies"' 44 by firms and
incentives for regulated entities to invest in litigation in order to avoid or
delay regulatory compliance. 45 Also, because technology-based standards
often impose disproportionate standards on new entities, they discourage
new investment.' 46 Furthermore, a technology-based regime discourages
"intelligent priority setting"'147 by the EPA because the cost of recognizing a
new threat to the environment is prohibitive; this, Ackerman and Stewart
argue, leads to "administrative inertia."' 148 In addition, Sunstein argues that
142. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1334-40 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 607, 627-31.
143. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 142, at 1335; see also Sunstein, supra note 142, at 628
(describing the economic inefficiency of technology-based regulation).
144. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 142, at 1336.
145. Id. at 1337.
146. Id. at 1336; see also Sunstein, supra note 142, at 628 (describing the investment
disincentives caused by technology-based standards).
147. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 142, at 1359.
148. Id. at 1360. Ackerman and Stewart note that "the defect of the [best available technology
(BAT)] system is that it tends to select, more or less arbitrarily, relatively few pollutants and
devotes enormous administrative and control resources to regulating them to the hilt." Id.
However, the authors also acknowledge that, as exemplified by air toxics regulation, it is "feasible
to do a better job of goal-setting-by introducing cost-effectiveness considerations in evaluating
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technology-based strategies decrease opportunities for citizen participation
by focusing unnecessary attention on "largely incidental and nearly
impenetrable questions about currently available technologies, rather than
on the appropriate levels of reduction."'1 49 In short, the main criticisms
levied against technology-based standards are that they are inefficient, are
detrimental to technological innovation, and misdirect the attention and
priorities of regulators and the public.
In response to these criticisms, the proponents of technology-based
standards, notably, Professors Wagner and Latin, offer the following,
compelling justifications.5 0 Wagner begins her analysis with a useful
categorization of pollution-control measures:
Some pollution control measures are stop-gap or foundation types
of innovations; others may be considered secondary innovations
that perfect or fine-tune the more primitive foundation controls.
The first category of innovations I call base innovations because
they are at the core or foundation of an environmental regulatory
program. 151
Focusing on base innovations, she argues that "technology-based standards
are generally the first and best answer to pollution control" and are "such
dependable base innovations that they should be the first tool
considered."' 52 The "outstanding" characteristics of this regulatory tool
include the moral imperative it imposes on regulated entities to "do their
best,"'153 as well as the relative ease of promulgation,
15 4 enforcement,' 55
predictability,'5 6 and adaptability.' 57
control options for different risks and setting priorities even more intelligently-even within the
BAT system." Id. at 1363.
149. Sunstein, supra note 142, at 629. But see Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing
Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 303 (1995). Heinzerling describes the legislative process
that led to the sulfur dioxide trading program created by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments as
one that did not "force democratic deliberation about the environment" as Sunstein, Ackerman,
and Stewart would contend, but that illustrated Congress's focus on "satisfying powerful interest
groups through its allocation of permits." Id.
150. See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267 (1985) (offering
justifications for the use of technology-based standards); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of
Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (describing the benefits of technology-
based standards); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729 (responding to the critics of
technology-based standards, and suggesting the continued validity of technology-based standards
both on normative and practical grounds).
151. Wagner, supra note 150, at 87.
152. Id. at 88.
153. Id. at 92.
154. See id. at 95-96 ("[T]echnology-based standards still significantly outpace-generally
by a factor ranging from three to ten times-the promulgation rate of most alternatives, such as
standards based on environmental needs, health-related needs, or a cost/benefit analysis of what
level of protection is appropriate."). Although "incentive-based environmental innovations, such
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The notion of adaptability is particularly important. As Wagner argues,
technology-based standards are uniquely compatible with most secondary
innovations and "thus serve as quintessentially hospitable and adaptable
base innovations."' 58 Therefore, "one can add a pollution market to
technology-based standards but would face great difficulty attempting the
reverse. ' I 9 Moreover, their uniformity and applicability across geographic
locations "can be used to ensure that at least some environmental protection
is in place if pollution markets do not work or are slow to become
operational."
1 60
Professor Latin offers similar arguments, suggesting that critics'
"excessive preoccupation with theoretical efficiency" disregards the fact
that "any system for environmental regulation must function despite
pervasive uncertainty, high decisionmaking costs and manipulative strategic
behavior resulting from conflicting private and public interests."' 161 In such
a "second-best" atmosphere, technology-based controls, while not the most
"theoretically efficient" device, often prove to be the most effective in
practice. Moreover, Latin warns that while scholars, with the genuine
intention of improving efficiency, may advocate fine-tuning strategies,
"[a]dministration officials may advocate 'fine-tuning' precisely because
they believe it will seldom work in practice and would therefore accomplish
sub rosa deregulation."' 162 In light of the recently proposed EPA actions and
the Bush Administration's frequent professions of market-based preference,
one could view Latin's warning as carrying an uncomfortable ring of truth.
as markets and information-disclosure approaches, may be developed and implemented
considerably more quickly than technology-based standards. . it is not clear that meaningful
pollution reduction is achieved more quickly." id. at 98.
155. See id. at 101 ("[B]ecause the reference point is a definable technology for which
numerical standards have been nationally developed, technology-based requirements are almost
always clear, easy to codify, and easy to reflect in permit requirements."). This also facilitates
environmental enforcement by private citizens. "Technology-based standards employ a common
sense, moral approach to pollution control that can be readily understood by citizen-onlookers."
Id. at 103.
156. See id. at 101 ("Even markets (at least as they operate today) cannot give sources a
dependable outlay of pollution abatement costs over the future, since the cost of pollution permits
can vary dramatically from year to year.").
157. ld. at 106.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. The trading regime for sulfur dioxide emissions, established in Title IV of the 1990
Amendments, highlights the potential importance of technology-based standards as a backup
regulatory regime. "Chicago Board of Trade figures for 1999, for example, suggest that about
seventy percent of current allowances and ninety-eight percent of future allowances (2004 and
after) were purchased by utilities based in the Midwest." Id. at 99. This creates interstate pollution
problems, particularly for Northeastern states that receive the brunt of downwind pollution from
Midwestern utilities, which, under a trading regime, have little incentive to reduce their emissions
or install pollution-control technology.
161. Latin, supra note 150, at 1270.
162. Id. at 1272.
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In suggesting the use of amortization provisions to bring more old
sources within the technology regime, I support the justifications posed by
the proponents of command-and-control approaches. In particular,
technology-based standards are an important first-line strategy, which can
be supplemented with secondary, more "finely-tuned" approaches. At the
same time, they serve as a kind of safety net regulatory strategy, which like
"circuit breakers," can "pre-empt the anticipated failure of another
instrument." 163 The proposal of this Note, which relies on the continued
utility of technology-based standards as a first-line approach, is not meant
to ignore the potential usefulness of market-based or alternate approaches
as secondary or supplemental measures. Rather, the need to have some
effective, first-line strategy in place seems all the more important while
regulators are in the process of experimenting with, expanding upon, and
"fine-tuning" the more "finely-tuned," market-based strategies.
164
VI. CONCLUSION
I have suggested the incorporation of amortization provisions as a
potential solution to the continued emissions problem posed by coal-
burning electric utilities built prior to the original Clean Air Act. Thirty
years after the Act's passage, these problematic sources have not, as the
original framers of the Act hoped, died after a "natural life" of thirty or
forty years. Instead, the Act's "old-new" division in pollution-control
technology requirements has, perversely, conferred unforeseen economic
advantages and extended the lives of these outdated plants. Although the
New Source Review and Prevention of Significant Deterioration programs
have had minor success in narrowing the old-new divide, the majority of
old sources remain untouched by the dictates of increasingly stringent
control technology requirements imposed upon their new source
counterparts.
Today, the threat of an expanding old-new divide looms even larger. A
broadening of the interpretation of "routine modification" proposed by the
Bush Administration EPA would serve to further cement the grandfathered
status of old electric utilities. Proponents of the rules change contend that
owners of these utilities face a Hobson's choice, deterring them from
modernizing their plants and making efficient changes for fear of triggering
163. Wagner, supra note 150, at 106; see also NEIL GUNNINGHAM, SMART REGULATION:
DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 407-08 (1998).
164. Even the proponents of market-based emissions trading systems acknowledge their
dangerous potential to create "hot-spots," which result when "large numbers of polluters who
receive permits through trades... locate in the same areas." Sunstein, supra note 142, at 636. For
a discussion of this and other difficulties regarding emissions trading, see STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 171-74, 271-84 (1982) (discussing difficulties such as strategic
bidding, monitoring, initial allocation of rights, and future price uncertainty).
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NSRIPSD pollution-control technology requirements. Indeed, the incentives
for making efficient changes to grandfathered sources are perverse. It is a
perversity that has evolved from trying to achieve un-grandfathering
through the back door, so to speak. But, it is also a perversity that has arisen
and been addressed in another context: the land-use context. Using the
evolution of zoning law as a guide, a takings-friendly solution to this
"Hobson's choice" becomes visible: the imposition of uniform amortization
provisions.
The conceptual problem posed by old, coal-burning utilities in the
context of air pollution regulation has proven highly analogous to the
problem of nonconforming uses in the zoning context. Preexisting
nonconforming uses in the land-use context could not be abolished outright
without compensation due to the constitutional protection afforded property
owners against unjust takings. In response to this problem, a pattern of
land-use doctrine emerged that is remarkably similar to the evolution of air
pollution regulation over the past thirty years. Namely, restrictions were put
upon the ability of a nonconforming-use owner to make changes to her
property. If the owner made any significant changes to the nonconforming
use, the use would no longer be permitted to continue. Similarly, after the
enactment of the NSR and PSD programs in the 1977 CAA Amendments,
any "major modification" would render a grandfathered facility "good as
new" for regulatory purposes. In both cases, these attempts to rein in old,
nonconforming facilities proved insufficient. In the zoning context,
however, the technique of amortization emerged as a way to eliminate
nonconforming uses provided that the amortization period was reasonable.
This technique was never incorporated into the air pollution context, and, in
this Note, I contend that this omission was a mistake that should be
remedied through immediate legislative action.
While the specifics of an amortization program, which would replace
the NSR and PSD programs in dealing with the electric utilities built prior
to the original CAA, are beyond the scope of this Note, I highlight one
important guideline in the establishment of "reasonable" amortization
periods-the use of full-time baselines, which would mandate that BACT
requirements be met in a few years. Also, because old plants have been
afforded unforeseen economic advantages as a result of the two-tiered
framework established thirty years ago, the "amortization compensation
equation," a vein of judicial reasoning that emerged in the billboard
context, has particular relevance. Although the view of amortization as
compensation due to the monopolistic position afforded the owners of a
nonconforming use has decreased in popularity in the context of aesthetic
billboard regulation, the shift is a result of a highly contentious and
questionable amendment to the Highway Beautification Act. If ever a
situation merited the legislative resuscitation of the amortization
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compensation equation, the problem posed by grandfathered electric
utilities seems the ideal scenario. In this way, through the careful
incorporation of amortization provisions mandating the imposition of best
available control technology for old sources, the thirty- to forty-year un-
grandfathering erroneously imagined by the original framers of the 1970
Clean Air Act can at last become a plausible, effective, and long awaited
reality.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
25892003]
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
